Individuals can manipulate the behavior of social partners. However, manipulation may conflict 17 with the fitness interests of the manipulated individuals. Manipulated individuals can then be 18 favored to resist manipulation, possibly reducing or eliminating the manipulated behavior in the 19 long run. I use a mathematical model to show that conflicts where manipulation and resistance 20 coevolve can disappear as a result of the coevolutionary process. I find that while manipulated 21 individuals are selected to resist, they can simultaneously be favored to express the manipulated 22 behavior at higher efficiency (i.e., providing increasing fitness effects to recipients of the 23 manipulated behavior). Efficiency can increase to a point at which selection for resistance 24 disappears. This process yields an efficient social behavior that is induced by social partners, and 25 over which the inducing and induced individuals are no longer in conflict. A necessary factor is 26 costly inefficiency. I develop the model to address the evolution of advanced eusociality via 27 maternal manipulation (AEMM). The model predicts AEMM to be particularly likely in taxa with 28 ancestrally imperfect resistance to maternal manipulation. Costly inefficiency occurs if the cost of 29 delayed dispersal is larger than the benefit of exploiting the maternal patch. I discuss broader 30 implications of the process. 31 In some taxa, individuals can control partially or completely the behavior of other individuals, an action 33 referred to as manipulation (Alexander, 1974, Dawkins, 1978. For example, baculoviruses manipulate 34 their host, a moth caterpillar, to climb trees; the caterpillars then die and liquefy at the tree top causing 35 a "virus rain" in the foliage below, thereby facilitating infection of new hosts (Hoover et al., 2011). 36 Workers in social insects can induce their siblings to develop as workers or queens by adjusting their 37 siblings' nutrition (Wheeler, 1986, O'Donnell, 1998. Drosophila males manipulate their sexual partners 38 by transferring seminal proteins during mating (Wolfner, 2002). Manipulation is facilitated when an 39 individual has direct access to another individual's physiology, as is the case for internal parasites 40 (Hughes et al., 2012, Adamo and Webster, 2013), for parents and offspring (Haig, 1993), and for mating 41 partners (Arnqvist and Rowe, 2005). In the absence of direct access to another individual's physiology, 42 an individual may manipulate another one through coercion, sensory exploitation, deception, and 43 self-deception. In particular, dominant individuals may coerce subordinates into helping roles 44 (Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995), males may stimulate females' pre-existing preferences to induce 45 mating (Holland and Rice, 1998), and humans may deceive themselves to fool social partners into 46 behaving in a given fashion (Trivers, 2011). 47 Manipulation can give rise to unlikely behaviors because the costs of expressing the behaviors are 48 not paid by the manipulators, but by the subjects of manipulation (or "subjects" for short). As a result, 49 costly behaviors can evolve under less stringent conditions (i.e., smaller benefit-cost ratios) than if the 50 behaviors were performed spontaneously; that is, without manipulation (Alexander, 1974, Trivers, 1974, 51 Charlesworth, 1978. However, costly behaviors diminish the reproductive success of the subjects.
Introduction
These fitness payoffs are modeled as follows. The reduction in the probability that a delayed individual becomes a parent, independently of whether the delayed individual helps, is denoted by c d .
The additional reduction in the probability that a delayed individual becomes a parent due to helping is c h . On the other hand, the increase in the probability of becoming a parent due to the exploitation of the maternal patch while not helping is b e . For simplicity, I ignore any frequency dependence in the payoffs c d , c h , and b e , and I treat them as constant. The total cost of acquiescence for a focal delayed first-brood individual is thus equal to
= c eff y 1 + c ineff (1 − y 1 ),
where the cost of efficiency and inefficiency are defined as
where Y is the average helping probability among delayed individuals in the patch, and b max is the 140 benefit a recipient of help gets when all delayed individuals in the patch help at their maximum 141 efficiency. Denoting by s 0 the baseline probability of becoming a parent (i.e., the probability that 142 offspring become parents when manipulation does not occur), I let b max = 1 − s 0 .
143
I follow the methods of Taylor and Frank (1996) and Frank (1997) to obtain dynamic equations for 144 the coevolution of manipulation p, resistance q, and helping efficiency y (see Appendix). At any given 145 time the population is divided into three classes of individuals: mothers, first-brood individuals, and 146 second-brood individuals. This treatment yields three regression relatednesses that affect the 147 evolutionary dynamics: the relatedness ρ 21 of first-brood offspring toward second-brood offspring, and 148 those of the mother toward the first and second brood (ρ 1m and ρ 2m respectively). For class-structured triggered behavior as being induced rather than being manipulated.
Evolutionary change in each trait

184
The population-average manipulation p, resistance q, and helping efficiency y increase respectively (see eqs. (19) in the Appendix) when
Manipulation, acquiescence, and helping efficiency are each favored when their respective inclusive 185 fitness effect is positive (conditions (4)). Manipulation conflict occurs when manipulation is favored 186 but acquiescence is not (i.e., when ineq. (4a) is met but ineq. (4b) is not). In that case, mothers attempt 187 to delay first-brood offspring in the maternal patch against the latter's inclusive fitness interests.
188
Offspring can rebel against manipulation by either resisting (i.e., dispersing from the maternal patch) or 189 by refusing to help. The conditions for the evolution of these two forms of rebellion are different if the 190 cost of inefficiency c ineff is not zero (see ineqs. (4b) and (4c)). The different conditions for the evolution 191 of acquiescence and helping efficiency can cause conflicting selection within first-brood offspring.
192
Thus, helping efficiency may evolve even though acquiescence is not favored.
193
Conditions (4) do not specify the conditions for conflict resolution because the benefit b and cost c 194 evolve as helping efficiency y changes. Consequently, whether or not conditions (4) are met varies with 195 the evolution of helping efficiency. In order to determine the conditions for conflict resolution, a 196 dynamic analysis is necessary (see §2 in the online Supporting Information (SI)).
197
Conditions for conflict resolution 198 The system evolves either to a state where manipulation disappears (p * = 0), to a state where resistance 199 is complete (q * = 1), or to induced behavior where manipulation, acquiescence, and helping efficiency 200 are established [(p * , q * , y * ) = (1, 0, 1)].
201
The evolution of induced behavior requires two conditions regarding resistance. First, acquiescence 202 must be favored when first-brood offspring help at their maximum efficiency, which occurs if
When condition (5) holds, the coevolutionary dynamics of resistance q and helping efficiency y are as described in Fig. 4A . Acquiescence can be disfavored at the start of the process, and the evolution of helping efficiency can render acquiescence favored if the population starts in the dark gray area in Fig. 4A. The population starts in the either the gray or dark gray area in Fig. 4A if the next condition is met.
Second, induced behavior requires that the probability of resistance is initially small enough, which
The variables with subscript "0" refer to the value of the variable at the initial time. The quantity S 205 measures selection for helping efficiency, which is positive when condition (5) holds. V q and V y are the 206 additive genetic variances for resistance and helping efficiency respectively.
207
Condition (6a) is related to Hamilton's rule (Hamilton, 1964 (Hamilton, , 1970 . Hamilton's rule states that 208 acquiescence is favored at the initial time if b 0 r > c 0 (from ineq. (4b)). The additional term in condition 209 (6a) measures the speed of increase in helping efficiency relative to that of resistance (S V y /V q ) and 210 the opportunity that helping efficiency has to render acquiescence favored (1 − q 0 ). Because this 211 additional term is positive when ineq. (5) holds, condition (6a) requires less stringent conditions 212 (smaller b/c ratios) to be met than those required for acquiescence to be favored at the initial time 213 (b 0 r > c 0 ). Condition (6a) may then be seen as defining a relaxed Hamilton's rule, which rather than 214 giving the direction of selection specifies when acquiescence can be obtained in the long run.
215
The evolution of induced behavior also requires two conditions regarding manipulation. First, 216 manipulation must be favored when first-brood offspring help at their maximum efficiency (ineq.
217
(S25a) in the SI). Second, the evolution of helping efficiency must be able to render manipulation 218 favored (ineq. (S25c) in the SI). If the probability of manipulation is initially small, the second condition 219 regarding manipulation simply states that manipulation must be favored initially.
220
Four conditions are then necessary and sufficient for induced behavior (ineqs. (S25) in the SI). If manipulation p and resistance q are initially small, induced behavior (p * , q * , y * ) = (1, 0, 1) evolves if all the following conditions hold:
Conditions (7a) and (7b) respectively state that both manipulation and acquiescence must be favored 221 when helping efficiency is maximal; condition (7c) states that manipulation must be initially favored; 222 and condition (7d) guarantees that acquiescence becomes favored as the population evolves.
223
The evolutionary resolution of manipulation conflict occurs when induced behavior is obtained and 224 acquiescence is not initially favored (i.e., conditions (7) are met but condition (4b) is not met initially).
225
The region of parameter space in which the conflict is resolved is narrow (black regions in Fig. 5 ).
226
However, the region for conflict resolution can be wider than the region in which first-brood offspring
The time is discrete. The number of individuals in class i at the current time step is N i (t ). The number 592 of individuals in class i in the next time step is N i (t + 1), which is given by the i -th entry in the column 593 vector N(t + 1) = WN(t ). For simplicity, fathers can be disregarded and it is enough to keep track of 594 mothers only. Letting the class order in the vector N be mothers, first brood, and second brood, the 595 transition matrix is
where s k is the survival of k-th-brood offspring (i.e., the probability that k-th-brood offspring become 597 mothers) and f k is the maternal fertility through k-th-brood offspring (i.e., the number of offspring 598 produced as brood k).
599
For simplicity, I assume that the fraction of female offspring produced is the same in the first and second broods. Let σ be the fraction of offspring that are female. Because for first-and second-brood offspring to become mothers they must be female, then the survival of first-brood offspring is
Let Q be the average resistance probability among manipulated first-brood offspring in the maternal patch. Then, the survival of second-brood offspring is
Let α be the fraction of offspring that belong to the first brood, and let n be the total number of offspring that a mother produces. Each offspring must be weighted by the genetic contribution towards it (Taylor, 1990) . The genetic contribution of the mother toward offspring of sex i is η i (i.e., for sexual diploids, η i = 1/2; for haplodiploids, η ♀ = 1/2 while η ♂ = 1). The genetic contribution of a mother to her offspring is thus on average η = ση ♀ + (1 − σ)η ♂ . Hence, maternal fertility through first and second broods is
From eq. (29) in Taylor and Frank (1996) and eqs. (6) and (2) in Frank (1997), assuming weak selection and weak mutation, the evolutionary change in the population-average value trait value z (= p, q, y) can be approximated by
where w i j is the i j -th entry in the transition matrix W, g z is the breeding value for trait z in the actor, V z 600 is the additive genetic variance for trait z, v i is the individual reproductive value for class-i individuals, 601 u j is the equilibrium frequency of class j individuals, and traits are evaluated at the population-average 
where T denotes transposition and the equations are evaluated at the population averages. The equilibrium frequencies u i are obtained by solving for N i in eq. (14a) and dividing the solution by N i .
The individual reproductive values v i are obtained by solving for N i in eq. (14b) together with the condition that the sum of class reproductive values is 1 (i.e., u i v i = 1, where u i v i is the reproductive value of class i ). The quantity λ is the dominant eigenvalue of the transition matrix W, which gives the asymptotic growth rate of the population. These calculations yield the equilibrium class frequencies
and the asymptotic growth rate
Because the available resources for offspring production only allow the mother to produce a number 604 of offspring that maintains the population size constant, the number of offspring is
in which case the asymptotic growth rate is λ = 1. Since competition is global, the number of offspring 606 n depends on the population-average trait values p, q, and y rather than on local average trait values.
607
Therefore, the dynamic equations specified by eq. (13) are
where r j i = ρ j i u j /u i . The quantity ρ j i = d g z j /d g z i is the regression relatedness of an actor in class i 610 toward a recipient in class j , where g z j is the breeding value for z in the recipient and g z i is that in the 611 actor. Hence, r j i is an equilibrium relatedness. Haplodiploids. For both panels, in the lightest gray area, helping efficiency is disfavored. For the other shades, helping efficiency is favored. In addition, for light gray: manipulation does not evolve; for gray: manipulation evolves, but resistance wins; for dark gray: manipulation evolves but acquiescence is favored from the start and it is established at the end; and for black: manipulation and resistance evolve, but resistance is eliminated by the evolution of helping efficiency. Specifically, each region satisfies the following. For the lightest gray, y(0) > y(1); for the other shades y(0) < y(1). In addition, light gray: p(0) > p(1), and p(end) < 0.1; gray: p(0) < p(1), q(0) < q(1), and q(end) > 0.9; dark gray: (1), and q(end) < 0.1; and black: p(0) < p(1), q(0) < q(1), y(0) < y(1), p(end) > 0.9, y(end) > 0.9, and q(end) < 0.1. White areas do not satisfy any of these conditions. The end is at 10 6 generations. Parameter values are as in Fig. 2 ancestral probability of resistance (q 0 ) is given by the fraction of coerced first brood that leave without delay. The ancestral probability of staying spontaneously (x 0 ) is given by the fraction of non-coerced first brood that stay in the maternal patch for a sufficiently large portion of their adulthood so that their reproductive success is decreased.
Figure legends
p(0) < p(1), q(0) > q
